philosophical writings

Universalism, utilitarianism in the context of Human Rights

2007-11-20T10:04:00.001+11:00

-- I only ask questions, in hope that the truth may be revealed through the process of blowing away grains of sand from the surface. I do not 'seek' the truth, because that implies that I already know what I am looking for, and thus, what I dig up may not in fact be the truth. --

After a chat with Joana Abrisketa and Adriana today, I feel a little more convinced that I am NOT a universalist, even though Joana definitely is.

If we say that human rights are universal, it means that we are finding a zone where there are a priori principles that ALL cultures agree upon:

This excludes the logical possibility of there being a culture that wouldn't share this universal zone:

Before I continue - let me explain the distinction between a logical possibility and a physical possibility:

A physical possibility denotes the limits of a system: If I were to jump out the window right now, what would happen? I would fall to the ground.

A logical possibility denotes the limits of the imagination: Can you picture, in your mind, me jumping out the window and floating to the sky instead of falling to the ground? The answer should be "yes". However, if I ask you to imagine a triangle with 5 sides, or that 2 +2 = 18, you are unable to, because these are logical impossibilities.

But there you are - above you have a logical possibility of there being a culture that doesn't share that zone. You can visualize it - there it is. So, because it is not necessarily true, it is no longer universal in the classical sense.

Thus - the conclusion that we come to, is that Universalism is something relative. It only is true within the 'box' that is called "Universalism":

However, even if we are to accept the universality of humanitarian principles, within the physical boundaries of this world, surely we can't believe that they are applicable in every case? Thus, if the principles are universal, but their applicability in certain areas is almost impossible, this makes the argument for universal human rights very weak. This is not to say, of course, that we should be rejecting them all together - it is simply pointing out that what we call 'universal' is still, logically speaking, relative. And also, to pose the question of whether there is any utility for a right that cannot be applied?

Here, I have a quote by Socrates, from Republic 9:

"In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order. But whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other."

This poses a new question for the universalist: Do you want to live in that city? What does it mean, if you live according to those 'universal' principles?

So - on to relativism. For those of you who find universalism unsatisfying, we can examine the dichotomy.

Relativists accept that there are many points of view, and that each point of view is correct, and fully justifiable:

Which means that we have a big problem already, for the relativist:

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Universalism must be correct and fully justifiable if relativism is correct!

So where does this leave us? We have logically rejected both extremes of the dichotomy. Perhaps, we should, instead, be questioning the rigid framework that working with dichotomies imposes upon us? Accepting dichotomies, and defining the world in terms of yes/no, good/evil, black/white delegitimizes everything in between as somehow watered down versions of the two 'pure' extremes. However, it is us that create dichotomies. They are not created in juxtaposition to each other! We have drawn the boundaries ourselves. Thus, there really are a lot of solutions that we don't have to view as 'compromises'. They can have a strength of their own.

If you ask me, I subscribe to a utilitarian school of thought. I don't think that human rights exist a priori (for those of you not of a philosophical background - 'a priori' means 'first' - in other words, if something exists 'a priori', it's existence is not dependent on anything else, and so there is no question of whether or not it is true), and we are simply in a process of discovering them.

I think there are no a priori truths, ie, in this case, a priori human rights. What we have is social contract. There are certain compromises that we should all come to in order to maximize the benefit for all. There are certain individuals who would choose to ignore these agreements that we come to, and therefore we exclude them from our society, or, having strength in numbers, we punish them for not accepting our point of view. But they are not universal, a priori rights. There are always people who think differently, and within their society, if they have one, they are not wrong.

The weakness here is that I would thus have to accept in a society where it maximised the overall benefit to abuse women, ignore environmental degradation and trample over labour rights, that we should still act to maximise benefits.

I don't believe that such a society ever existed. All it means is that a handful of more powerful persons claimed that such a society existed in order to maintain the status quo. That's what I believe.

But, otherwise - just a small thought to keep in mind: Most western nations did not sign many, if any at all, treaties or conventions affirming the inviolability of 'universal' rights for workers, women, children or humans until they had built up a strong capital base.

So, a couple more questions:

Is it fair to demand of developing nations certain standards that developed nations never themselves applied whilst they were themselves developing?

Or is it, in reality, a mechanism that developed nations have developed in order to maintain their status quo of global economic disparity?

Alcibiades on love and a chat on vulnerability...

2007-11-18T21:33:00.001+11:00

So, here's the story: Phaedrus, a humanist scholar; Pausanias, a sophist; Euriyximachus, a physician; and Aristophanes, a comic playwright; and Socrates, the philosopher are having dinner.

Socrates opens the theme of debate amongst the men, and it is the theme of love. Keep in mind, though, that this is ancient Greece. So, by way of analogy: People get together nowadays, and have heated debates about sex whilst drunk or high or just generally socialising. Back then it was love. And so Socrates poses the question, "What is love?"

And this has several responses.

Phaedrus argues that love is a part of human nature, and it is something beautiful, to be admired. His is the classical notion of romantic love, highly idealised:
"Love is the oldest of all gods, the benefactor of humankind, the inspiration of honor (a man would rather die than appear as a coward in the eyes of his beloved) and the spirit of self-sacrifice."

Pausanias distinguishes between base and noble love, whilst Euriyximachus, the physician sanitises love and gives it a very mechanical spin. Aristophanes reckons that we were split apart by angry gods, and we are wandering around looking for our other half (to which Socrates asks whether one would REALLY want to joined with the 'other half', physically and mentally, inseperably) if we were to find them. Then, finally, Agathon makes a few comments on the essential nature of love, at times agreeing, at times contradicting Phaedrus.

But then, in crashes Alcibiades, perhaps the only one actually IN love (with Socrates), completely drunk, and shares what he feels about the topic. And in it, he encompasses the rage, the desire, the admiration and frustration that no amount of theorising can capture.

"When we hear any other speaker, even very good one, he produces absolutely no effect upon us, or not much, whereas the mere fragments of you and your words, even at second-hand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them. And if I were not, afraid that you would think me hopelessly drunk, I would have sworn as well as spoken to the influence which they have always had and still have over me. For my heart leaps within me more than that of any Corybantian reveller, and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. And I observe that many others are affected in the same manner. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, and I thought that they spoke well, but I never had any similar feeling; my soul was not stirred by them, nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has often brought me to such pass, that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading (this, Socrates, you will admit); and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly as from the voice of the siren, my fate would be like that of others,-he would transfix me, and I should grow old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. And he is the only person who ever made me ashamed, which you might think not to be in my nature, and there is no one else who does the same. For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me. And therefore I run away and fly from him, and when I see him I am ashamed of what I have confessed to him. Many a time have I wished that he were dead, and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad, if he were to die: so that am at my wit's end."

Symposium is just two pages long, but enough to give us something to think about: http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/ancient-Greece/plato/plato-symposium.asp

So leading on from that, the topic of cruelty - well... I see an obvious link, anyhow... Getting into the head of Alcibiades (if you read Symposium, you'll understand, I think)

Anyhow, perhaps this conversation does start out on the topic of the causes of cruelty. However, it moves on to show that perhaps, the unfortunate fact is that there is no sincerity in the world, or if there is, it's in very negligible amounts. Here, Fon the undying optimist is shown that her 'leaps of good faith' in people are, in fact, not good things as she would like to believe they are...

fon: why are some people so cruel when they are hurt?

p: cos they are afraid

fon: of?

p: and they need to make themselves feel better
p: afraid of looking vunerable

fon: and what's wrong with looking vulnerable?

p: it's not an attractive atribute in this world
p: look at me

fon: what do you mean?

p: well i am indecisive . . .as u know, that means I have a weakness, which can be expolited, if someone chooses to . . .
p: so out of fear I may try to hurt someone elses feelings to make them feel no better than me
p: hypothetically of course

fon: and you think that is attractive?

p: no I think it is unattractive

fon: Here's what I think: Someone who is vulnerable can be either attractive or unattractive.

p: oooh I see

fon: By being honest, they are attractive

p: ooooh, so that is good for me, now i know why ur in love with me . . .:D
p: haha

fon: By trying to look strong, when they really aren't, they become very unattractive - especially if they do that by being cruel to others

p: i see

fon: What do you think?

p: i think people will always try to appear better than what they are and attack people who aren't - it's human nature
p: it's not a question of attractive or unattractive
p: it's a fact of life

fon: All people?

p: i am very surprised that u have problems - u seem to be sooo . . . strong and assured
p: yes, most people in my experience

fon: Well, I do tend to be quite 'strong and assured' as you put it - but i don't have a problem admitting if i feel weak

p: well . . .be careful who u admit this too
p: if u admit it to the wrong person . . . it can be a very bad thing

fon: I'd rather be honest with everyone... and if somebody wants to abuse that trust, well, what can i say... at least i am not the one living with secrets

p: very noble

fon:is it?
fon: it seems logical to me

p: yes, ur like a prince in a fairytale

fon: by harbouring negative feelings, am i not just making life more difficult for myself?

[after some random banter, a return to the topic]

fon: i value the kind of people who like to find out the truth for themselves

p: very noble

fon: stop saying that!
fon: it's just logical!

p: like i said u live like a olden day knight
p: unfortunately this logic may not serve u soo well in this day and age

fon: if you look at the big picture, it makes more sense to have principles that guide you than live in sordid self-interest!

p: sordid self interest?
p: wow
p: very profound

fon: ok, maybe you are right.... i live in my own fantasy world with principles in it

p: i think people like you, are the type that are usually describes as "taking the high road"
p: do u understand?

fon: high road?
fon: oh shit

p: it means moral high ground
p: unfortunately this is "the road less travelled"
p: haha, wow, I am very philosophical too eh?

fon: so i'm screwed in other words

p: no ur not, as long as u only associate with people on the same road as you

fon: hehe.... well, you get philosophical, talking to someone somewhat bent on philosophy

p: u got me talking in metaphors tonite
p: :D
p: philosphy is good, but don't get caught up in it too much

fon: lol... but there's no fun in associating with moral people

p: ooooh i see, so u want someone different? someone exciting?
p: then ur setting yourself up to for a "big fall"

fon: oh, i've taken that big fall many a times

p: and u'll probably take it many times again I think

fon: it's like bunjee jumping though
fon: you don't really fall, and there's no limit, really, on how many times you can do it

p:yes but u know what happens with bunjee jumping?

fon: what?

p: after u go down u get quite as high as what u originally were, and over time the stress slowly damages ur joints and muscles
p: from the strain

[more banter]

fon: well, let's call it a strength, to be able to be open about weaknesses then!

p: oooh haven't u listened to anything I said

fon: nope, i'm really stubborn
fon: aren't i?

p: i know i know

fon: haha

p: even what u told me can now be used against u
p: if i choose to

fon: yeah, but i trust you

p: don't u understand?
p: u can't trust me, that's the point

fon: but i DO

p: got it?
p: but u can't, what if I turn around and betray ur trust?

fon: I trust everyone until they prove otherwise, and even then, I prefer to give them another chance

fon: so what?
fon: I won't die if you betray my trust
fon: I'll get over it and live another day, and I'll try to understand why you wanted to betray my trust

p: NO!
p: u don't let people make mistakes, cos oneday u lose something more important than what u experienced before

fon: There's nothing wrong with losing things

p: oooh fon fon

But if anyone would like to be encouraging, please defend my argument for trust!! I believe that there is no reason to distrust anyone until they prove that they are really not worth trusting - and that by trusting people, they will, in most cases, live up to that trust. But if you start off not trusting them, you are not giving that person an opportunity to show that they are trustworthy either... My "naive" conclusion: As a general rule, trust people.

This is my own version of rule utilitarianism.

Quick rundown: Utilitarian philosphy: "maximise overall benefits"

This means, in principle, that if I borrow $20 from you, and on my way to return it to you, I see a starving beggar, I should give it to the beggar. And then, I should tell you that the beggar needed it more than you, and therefore, I didn't return your money.

So, there's something wrong with that, no?

Thus, I should extract myself from everyday situations and look at general rules that maximise benefits, instead. So now I have a rule that says, "Always return what you borrow"

Thus, when in doubt, I have a rule to fall back on (thus, rule utilitarianism).

So now I do return you the money, if I live by those principles.

Ok... so in this case, trust. I don't know whether or not to trust you - but because I have a rule that says that the best way to maximize benefit is by trusting people (if you don't trust them, you'll never ask them for anything, and thus, never benefit), now I will trust you. Obviously, this doesn't mean that I ALWAYS have to trust everyone, but at least, now I have a guiding principle. Good, no?

Elephants recognise themselves

2006-10-31T21:20:00.000+11:00

I just read an article in the guardian about the ability of elephants to recognise themselves in a mirror.

That's great! Another animal added to the list of 'self-aware beings'. But is a test of self-recognition in the mirror the only way to test this? I mean, vanity can't be the only factor in deciding that a creature is able to know itself, is it?

What would happen if it was discovered that cows, sheep, chickens, etc, had an ability to recognise themselves as a 'person' with future plans, past memories, etc? How can we KNOW that they don't? Peter Singer argues that they probably don't - and even humans up to the age of 2 don't. But we certainly don't eat 2 year old infants.

And why? Well... a desire not to suffer plays a huge role. So how is it that humans continue to justify eating meat, given that we know that all sentient beings have a desire atleast not to suffer? Are we really so selfish that we can continue to kill pigs, milk cows by attaching them to machines all their lives, coop up chickens so that they cannot move?

How can we treat creatures that all have a desire to not suffer as means to our own dietary ends, which, might I add, are not even necessary dietary ends?

What I wish for humanity: That one day, we'll all be kinder.

Morality, Happiness and Freedom: The Role of a Monarch in a Modern Nation-State

2006-10-17T00:59:00.000+10:00

The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from ... [dealers] … ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined ... [because they] ... have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public.

Adam Smith

In order to discuss the concept of freedom, it is important to ask first what it is that an individual would be free to do. One view of freedom is that it means being able to do what one wants to do. This is the "primitive" view of freedom, or negative freedom as proposed by writers such as Mills and Locke: "Liberty, 'tis plain, consists in a power to do or not to do; to do or forbear doing as we will."

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Doctrine of Annatta and Eliminativism

2006-06-15T18:32:00.000+10:00

Introduction__________________________________________________________

For the Western reader, it may be useful to begin exploration of the concept of Anatta by comparison to a Western philosopher. Much of what is contained in Buddhist teachings are argued by Derek Parfit in "Personal Identity" (1971) and in "Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons" (1987). By comparing Buddhism to Reductionism, of which Parfit is a champion, we can contextualise the Buddhist doctrines. Parfit likens himself to Buddhist philosophy – in fact, it is said that he considers it anticipatory of his own views (Siderits, 1997, 455). However, I believe that he is wrong to interpret the Buddhist texts as containing any reference to continuity.

In this paper, I shall first explain the doctrine of Anatta as contained within the context of Buddhist discourse, then I shall examine the ways in which Parfit can be said to hold identical views, and in which ways he has differing views or purpose to Buddhism. I will not be discussing the application of Anatta across lifetimes in any detail, as that is a topic that would exclude discussion on Parfit. I will argue that where Buddhism and Parfit diverge is on the matter of psychological continuity. Also, while the Buddhist account of Reductionism leads to the incoherence of even conventional wisdom, Parfit encounters difficulties in reducing experiences further after a point, and retains conventional thought as a useful discursive tool. While the Buddhist can explain the smallest units of existence in terms of causal relations to each other, Parfit cannot, given that he places special emphasis on the importance of psychological continuity.

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Anatta - the rejection of self

2006-05-13T08:50:00.000+10:00

1. Continuity of the self and the doctrine of Anatta

The Buddhist doctrine of Anatta denies the existence of the ‘self’ or the soul. What is perceived to be ‘the self’ is but a combination of matter and states of mind – the five ‘skandhas’ – aligned temporally in rapid succession, so as to give an illusion of continuity. The term ‘I’ is but a convenient designation for the five skandhas (also known as name and form) – form, feelings, perceptions, predispositions, and consciousness. (2006(1) Chadha, 2004 Chadha, p. 125).

This may seem counter-intuitive, as generally speaking, one feels that they are the same person at this time as they were the previous day, or ten days ago. However, Bhante Nagasena claims that “…the duration of the life of a living being is exceedingly brief, lasting only while a thought lasts” (2004 Chadha, p. 123). Without the soul, or any continuous element, some explanation is required for the intuition that the self at t1 and at t5 are still the same.

The doctrine of dependent origination may shed some light on this. When Bhante Nagasena says “…neither as the same nor as a different person do you arrive at your latest aggregation of consciousness,” (ibid) he is referring to the aforementioned doctrine (ibid, p. 124). One combination of name and form is directly causally responsible for the next combination, in the same way in which milk is causally related to cream, which is then causally related to butter (ibid, p. 123). One does not equate the butter to the milk, but also cannot deny that it is because of that milk that the butter came to be. Thus, when he says that they are ‘neither the same’, he means they are not qualitatively or numerically identical to each other. Just as the milk and the butter are not the same thing, the person is no longer the same person from one moment to the next. When he says ‘nor are they different’, he means that they are nonetheless causally dependent on each other, and that one could not come into being without the existence of the previous stage (2006(1) Chadha).

2. Mimamsa view: Continuity of the self over time

The Nyaya/Vaisesika arguments for the self refer to ‘the best possible explanation’. They infer that since there is activity, there must be a ‘self’ that causes this activity. Also, if there are properties, there must be a self that bears these properties. Since one uses ‘I’, there must be a referent – the self. Finally, there is memory, and this is evidence of a persisting self over time (2004 Chadha, p.200-1)

The Buddhists, however, disagreed with the Nyaya arguments. For each of those four factors, they claimed, could be explained by person-stages causally succeeding each other, and that therefore, the self is not necessary as an explanation (2006(4) Chadha).

The Mimamsa arguments are an attempt at defending Hinduism against Buddhist thought. They considered the Buddhist objections to the Nyaya arguments to be valid, and therefore expanded on the Nyaya argument from memory. They agree with the Buddhists is saying that memory can be explained by means of causal relations. However, instead of saying that this is evidence for a continuously existing self, they say that this reveals the self, because in each of those stages, there is an ‘I’ that has experiences and perceives (1992 Taber, p. 203). It is not merely the perception of my laptop on an orange meditation cushion, but the knowledge that it is ‘I’ that has this experience. It is this recognition of the self as the perceiver that reveals the self in any given moment.

The next stage of this argument is dependent on the first. If it is ‘I’ that does the experiencing at any given moment, then it must be the same ‘I’ that remembers it now. If I say ‘I remember I have been sick for the past two days’, then it is ‘I’ at this moment which is equivalent to the ‘I’ of two days ago and the ‘I’ of yesterday. To reach the ‘I’ of yesterday, one could say, ‘I remember that yesterday I remembered having been sick for a day.’ Thus, the Mimamsa argument reveals a self that experiences at different stages and equates them to one another.

3. Regressive self

As already apparent from the aforementioned ‘I remember that yesterday I remembered having been sick for a day’, there is here a possibility for an infinite regress. I can say ‘I know that I know that right now I remember… etc’. It is because of this infinite possibility for regress that the Buddhist would say that the experience was not of recognising oneself as being sick, but merely of the sensation of sickness as a cognitive state, and thus, the recollection is of that cognitive state (2004 Chadha, p. 238).

There is a proposed thought experiment that could possibly help to overcome this difficulty of regress. This is to first “imagine being an elephant” and then to “imagine you yourself being an elephant” (2006(4) Chadha). If there is no phenomenological difference between these to imaginings, then this is victory for the Mimamsa. The regress problem is but a linguistic one, and not a philosophical one, if this is the case.

However, both of these experiences are entirely fictional. I can imagine being an elephant or myself being an elephant, but there are no phenomenological differences between them simply because this is not a physical possibility. If I were to imagine ‘cooking dinner’ and ‘I myself cooking dinner’ the picture becomes different. In fact, I can easily understand cooking dinner, but the addition of ‘I myself’ makes the concept more difficult to comprehend, as I must then ask ‘How do I imagine an ‘I myself’?’

Of course, only my experience is not enough to discount the Mimamsa argument. It is worth noting that the Mimamsa argument is still an account that offers inferential evidence for ‘the self’ and can not provide empirical evidence. It is saying that what is revealed through these experiences is a ‘self’ (1992 Taber, p. 204). This view is troublesome for the Buddhist view, as Buddhist philosophy can not provide a more plausible alternative, yet neither is the Mimamsa argument more plausible than the Buddhist. The Mimamsa requires one to accept the ‘self’ as being ‘revealed’, whereas the Buddhist will argue that it is not the ‘self’ that is revealed, but a ‘person-stage’ consisting of name and form.

References

Chadha, M. 2006, ‘Topics in Indian Philosophy 2006 – Lecture 9: Buddhist View: The Doctrine of Anatta (No-Self), Monash University
Chadha, M. 2004, PHL2850/3850 Topics in Indian Philosophy – Study Guide and Readings, Churchill, Monash Distance Education Centre
Taber, J. A. 1992, ‘The Mimamsa theory of self-recognition’ reprinted in PHL2850/3850 Topics in Indian Philosophy – Study Guide and Readings, Churchill, Monash Distance Education Centre
Chadha, M. 2006, ‘Topics in Indian Philosophy 2006 – Lecture 8: Mimamsa argument for the Persisting Self’, Monash University

Hinduism and Buddhism

2006-03-24T10:54:00.000+11:00

What does one know upon being born? According to the Yoga sutras of Patanjali, nothing is known, except for the fear of death. “For even a child just born trembles at the sight of a murderous thing” says the verse, and this suggests that this fear of death comes from a previous life-time. Just as one can only fear fire if one has once been burned, so one can only fear death if one has once before died. This suggests that the fear of death is deeply embedded in soul of one who has just recently died and been reborn.

Why is it, then, that no other fears or memories reside in the soul of the one reborn? Is it only “murderous things” that make children tremble, or is it perhaps simply anything loud and/or unfamiliar? In fact, most children under about two seem to not bat an eyelid at death, blood and gore, seemingly not recognizing it as anything out of the ordinary. The argument seems opportunistic. One could equally argue that due to the proximity of the experience of death, the soul is familiar with and therefore not scared of death until it forms an attachment to life. The underlying assumption is that going through the experience of death will leave one fearful. By analogy, though, if one is afraid of jumping into dark water, once one leaps in and dives under, will that fear not subside? Thus, going through death should cause a cessation in the fear of death, not vice versa.

If we accept transmigration, then we must ask why all beings do not fear death. Transmigration requires all beings, from a cooking pot[1] to a priest to fear death, as the knowledge is stored in the soul, and even the cooking pot has a soul. On the assumption that a cooking pot does not fear death, we then have to limit this theory to all sentient beings, thus bringing us to the Buddhist thesis.

Buddhist tradition rejects the soul. The physical and the mental are all lumped together as being purely matter. In the Buddhist view, every second matter changes and particles are in motion. The theory suggests that a person is not a stable entity, not even in one lifetime, and that can not see the same person twice. Just as the saying goes “You can’t step into the same river twice” – so the Buddhist philosophy views the world. When analyzing the theory of self, this seems problematic. The people around a person do not become unrecognizable from one moment to the next.

However, this philosophy asks one to think of oneself as being composed of particles that affect each other, just like billiard balls bouncing against each other on a table. This applies to both physical as well as mental matter.

Since the particles of the psyche and body are constantly in a state of flux, it is as though one dies every moment and is reborn in every moment. This may seem disturbing and lacking in continuity. However, the Milindapanha explains that although a fire passing from one torch to the next may not be same fire, the two flames are still necessarily causally linked. As long as nothing drastic happens, the particles of matter that form a person will not have been greatly affected so as to render a person unrecognisable

However, in certain circumstances, drastic circumstances do happen. Perhaps the person’s consciousness is destroyed, and the matter of the psyche is propelled to the mind of a developing foetus. Perhaps the leg is amputated, and this deteriorates, causing plants to grow, food to be consumed, and another person being nourished. No soul is needed in this chain of causality, and thus, causality without a soul. Everything is intrinsically connected, and thus, there is no need for a soul to be the carrier of karma – whether good or bad. Looking back to the billiard ball analogy – the angle at which one ball hits another determines the course that next ball will take.

This analogy of billiard balls may support a criticism of the theory of karma, though. It seems that if we are nothing but billiard balls, be it in the Hindu or Buddhist account, then this is terribly deterministic, and we really have no control over our own lives and futures. It may seem that life and all that will come to occur is all pre-decided by events that we no longer remember or connect ourselves with.

In either account, unless one is conscious, one truly is like that billiard ball. However, an unconscious being cannot accumulate karma, but only burn it off precisely by being bounced around like that billiard ball. Once there is sentience, the only thing that Karma can control is circumstance. Perhaps a person can not control the gust of wind blowing a window open, causing the house to flood with rainwater. However, a person can determine whether to stand and watch one’s possessions swept away, or to take a bucket and scoop away the water. A sentient being, then, in both accounts, has the power to propel itself in any direction, with the weight of past Karma as a springboard only.

It is the decisions that a sentient being makes, then, that cause positive or negative turns in this and future lives. It can then be argued that in fact, the theory of Karma does not take away one’s control of a lifetime, but rather, that it means that control is not only present in this lifetime, but extends to consequent lifetimes. It means that one can perform actions in this lifetime as to influence the outcome of a future life. In a famous Thai television series, a man is reborn homosexual as a result of inadvertently (through his actions) causing the death of his wife and two mistresses in a previous lifetime. His rebirth is a result of having caused so much suffering due to lust for women. Instead, he is born with no desire for them. In this lifetime, he has accounts to settle with the people who surrounded him in the previous lifetime. How he chooses to move from here is his decision and will determine his next life.

[1] On another note: The cooking pot also ‘suffers on flames’ for its negative karma. However, fire does not in any way damage a cooking pot, the way fire damages a human being. If water is the element of a fish, then is not fire the element of the cooking pot? If the fish is not suffering from being under water, then I don’t see why the cooking pot is suffering for being on the fire.

Long quote

2005-03-31T03:24:00.000+10:00

This isn't actually my writing... but it's something a dear friend (who I've since lost touch with) put together for me....

Creativity and Expression

Express: If you have no means of expression, who will experience the beauty of your heart?

Be Yourself: Can you imagine an owl trying to be an eagle, or an eagle trying to be an owl? Can you imagine an owl attempting to hunt like an eagle in the bright light of day? Can you imagine an eagle trying to hunt in the dark of the night? Can you imagine an owl trying to glide gracefully on the thermals? Can you imagine an eagle in all its majesty, closeted in the darkness of a barn? Both birds beautiful in their own sphere, but outside of it, inept and awkward. So then, why do people who are owls try to be eagles, and eagles owls?

The Power of Words: The power of words to move the listener is not simply in their truth but in the emotion and spirit with which they are imbued and which they evoke.

Value

Self -Worth: Who is more valuable than you? Who has a more Divine Soul?

Value: There are superior and inferior personalities but not superior and inferior people: some people have superior minds, some superior bodies, some skills, creative talents and emotional dispositions, but all people, by virtue of being people, have a Soul which is of infinite value.

Gauging Self-esteem: In the act of doing something, ask yourself, “If I had complete self-esteem, that is, if I regarded myself as being completely valuable, how would I be thinking, feeling and acting now? Then make the necessary adjustments to reflect and reinforce this truth.

Courage

The Capacity To Succeed: If something is truly right for you to do, then it can be done.

Be Yourself: Be Yourself, Be Real. Don’t let one person move you one fraction of anything from who or what or where you must be. Stand your ground.

Freedom

Strength: No one has any power over you unless you allow it.
Freedom: Freedom is just to be, fully in the moment, on the current of conscience.
Lightly and Rightly: To hold rightly is to hold lightly.
Centring

Direction: Most of the time, the direction we should take is clear enough, therefore, most of life’s effort lies not in the deciding, but in the doing.

Intuitive Guidance: Repeatedly, I have found that it is not that I lack intuitive guidance, but rather, I lack the courage, discipline or humility required to express that guidance and put it into practice.

Perspective: One way of gaining a deeper and more accurate insight into yourself and your life is to view yourself as someone else and your life as that of someone else. In this way it is easier to separate wisdom, as a combination of reason and intuition, form the clouds of emotion. What do you see now? What would you advise?

Conversing With Your Soul: A technique which you can use to tap into your intuition, is to imagine that beside you is a person of great wisdom, love and peace, a person that wants, without reservation, for you to attain happiness, insight and love, and for you to realise your full potential. Now, discuss your problem with that person. As he speaks, you understand that he does so without the distorting influences of fear, anger, hate, desire, sadness, jealousy and similar hues of black and grey - he speaks the truth. He says only what is true, and it resonates within you as the truth when you hear it. He confirms what you already know in those moments when you are calm, at peace, and when you have stepped back from, and above, the events of life. This person is, of course, the personification of your Soul. And by projecting your Soul, through your imagination, into the person beside you, a person who is without negative emotion, you help to free your own intuition from the distorting influences of emotion; you hear only your own inner wisdom.

Being True and Conscience

The Key: Following the Conscience, this deepest sense of duty, this primary sense of virtue or goodness, is the key which opens the consciousness to deepening love, truth, beauty, power and virtue, in short, the many facets of the unity which is the unity of the Soul. Any attempt to artificially and externally contrive, attain and force these traits of God is useless, rather, abide within your sense of Righteousness, and they will develop naturally and organically.

Ordinary Conscience and Divine Conscience: There is a world of difference between the belief that conscience is the voice of God and the belief that it is not. In the latter case, it is simply another voice within the mind whose transgression will cause a degree of suffering; in the former, it is the voice of God expressing, and supported by, all the power, wisdom and love of God. Accordingly, the power bestowed by each will be vastly different.
Being: We need to be exactly what we want to attract to ourselves, including from within.

Spirituality

Sunsets and God: Sometimes it is better to behold a sunset, or perhaps, better still, a sunrise, than to ask, “Does God Exist?”

The Significance of Dreams: If there is a Higher Power ‘behind’ life orchestrating its events, is it unreasonable to assume that dreams, which come and go in sleep which accounts for approximately one third of our lives, are Spiritually inspired and/or have a purposeful role in life ?

Life and Vocation: Life prepares you for your vocation, or calling as Jung might say. With what capacities and motivations have you been blessed, and, what types of opportunities and challenges does Life consistently throw at you to push you and your development in a particular direction ?

Well-being

Help In A Crisis: In a time of real crisis everything in your life will be speaking to you; Life will not neglect you when are in most need and ready to make the most progress - look particularly to the people around you, even if they remain silent.

Dissolving Fear: When walking into a breeze or the wind, imagine it flowing through you and carrying away with it all your fears.

Imagined Fears: Most fears are imagined.

Philosophy
Inescapably Philosophical: Life, particularly its suffering, coupled with our innate capacity for abstract thought, compels us to engage in philosophy - the search for progressively deeper meaning. Hence, we are philosophers by necessity and design. More succinctly, life coupled with a thinking mind means we are by necessity and design, philosophers.

The Necessity of Philosophy: We are, from early childhood to death, giving time and energy, consciously or unconsciously, to working out our philosophy of life. Just how important our beliefs are, and the power they have in determining our lives, is evidenced by our strong emotional reactions to their violation or even the mere questioning of their truth. Being so important, why do we spend so little time and effort in developing our system of belief into something deeper, clearer and more comprehensive? To object that rational thought can give us no definite answers has not stopped, and will not stop, us from continuing to reflect on our lives; we are designed to search for meaning - this is irrepressible. So why not make the inevitable process of reflection more productive by giving it more time and energy?
A Life’s Lessons: Each life revolves around a few lessons; over and over, deeper and deeper, gradually they are learnt.

The Danger of Knowledge: Knowledge is a dangerous business - once you know the truth, your conscience will command that you live it, if you don’t, the compromise will cause you to suffer. No longer can ignorance be bliss and a refuge.

The Subtle Mind: The subtle and intuitive mind sees mystery and possibility in things which are accepted as commonplace and unworthy of consideration by the obtuse mind. The obtuse mind simply accepts the emotion of love or beauty, the subtle mind asks and searches for their source. The obtuse mind accepts time and space, the subtle mind perceives that they are mysteries, the resolution of which may lead to great revelations about the nature of reality.

Too Great A Demand: People who attribute the creation of consciousness with its capacities for free will, intelligence, creativity, love, compassion, and beauty, to matter or energy, do not understand what they ask form this senseless stuff; and if they reply that matter or energy are not senseless - lacking in intelligence and feeling - and therefore, can produce consciousness, then, is it not being asserted that consciousness already exists in matter or energy, and is not produced by them, and aren’t we are beginning to return to God or Spirit in nature ?

Patience and Faith

Faith: Faith is the certainty that a way will be found to what the heart rightly longs for, where the mind can see no way, or even, any possibility of a way.

Readiness: When we are ready, the person, thing or experience we need will come to us, and we can no more keep that moment from arriving than we can hold back the sea with our hands or keep the sun from rising in the sky. When that person, thing or experience arrives, then, often, we have a choice - to embrace it or let it pass. But, if we attempt to forgo what we need, it will return - for it is needed. In essence, Life will always bring us who or what we need, and therefore, we should not worry about whether or when a person or experience will arrive. Our only concern is to nurture what is right and good in our lives - in this way we attract what will give us love, beauty, happiness, peace, power and wisdom - the qualities of the Divine - and not their opposites. This is to cooperate with Life .

Commitment: Life responds to commitment.

Suffering

Gifts: A gift may become suffering, suffering may become a gift - the choice is yours.

Purification: Purification requires experience, for it is through experience that we endure loses, and without actual loses or separations, there is only the semblance of purification. All talk of purification without actual experience and loss is simply that, talk. All experience of purification without pain is simply that, talk. If we understood the value and necessity of purification, then we would more easily accept our loses and suffer less. The path of self-development, of Enlightenment, is pain, of being forced, and forcing oneself, to let go, accept and surrender. Naturally, most people are not really interested in Enlightenment. Naturally, most people do not become interested in Enlightenment until forced.

Blessings: All my curses have become blessings.

Compassion and Love

Steps To Evil, and Steps Back To Love: Beneath evil is hate. Beneath hate is anger. Beneath anger is hurt. Beneath hurt is love - the need for love.

Not For Oneself Alone: One’s life is not for oneself alone: a woman reaches a turning point in her life when he realises that all her efforts to improve herself are not only for herself alone but for everyone whom her life touches; its not just the quality of her own life which is at stake here .

Nurturing Love: Not enough love? Express what little you have and it will grow - within you and around you.

Strength and Gentleness: So far as the conduct of life is concerned, strength must be balance by gentleness, and gentleness by strength. Without each other, pain and suffering will result, with each other, peace and happiness. Still more is required: strength must have some gentleness, and gentleness some strength. Strength without gentleness is weakness, and gentleness without strength is weakness. This is the expression of egoism and desire. Strength with gentleness is true strength, and gentleness with strength is true gentleness. This is the expression of the Soul or Spirit.

The Learning of Compassion: To be compassionate, we must experience the pain or suffering of the other person (or animal) to some degree, without this connection, we will feel nothing. We are only able to do this by drawing on our own experience of what it means to suffer - without having endured our own suffering, we cannot understand, or feel, what the other person is experiencing. However, if our own past experience is unresolved and our suffering still strong, then the sight of another’s suffering may well evoke our unresolved experience and our great suffering in a way which is overwhelming, causing us to be submerged in pain or to withdraw in self-defence.

Children

Children: “Assuredly, I say to you, whoever does not receive the kingdom of God as a little child will by no means enter it.” (Mark 10:15). Children teach us and re-teach us awe and wonder, the beauty of innocence, to be present in, and live for, the moment, to unfold spontaneously and not to impose our false pre-conceptions on the world thereby veiling its reality and shutting out its possibilities, its mystery. But these qualities must be tempered and balanced, just as we see this need for our children: innocence, the state of being which sees the world as good and beautiful, must be balanced by an appreciation suffering and evil, albeit, temporal and apparent; living in the moment, must be balanced by the need to set goals, albeit to hold them lightly; spontaneity must be balanced with temperance of the passions, more generally, temperance of excess; there is a need to drop false preconceptions but also to develop an accurate rational understanding of reality as part of guiding one’s life wisely; a need to balance possibilities with realities; and while feeling the mystery of life with its possibilities, to find an end to the yearning for understanding through realisation of the Truth.

Good, evil and knowledge

2004-11-02T06:17:00.000+11:00

Knowing what is good and what is evil is an important step in choosing to do what is right. If we are to concede, by Socrates’ way of thinking, that the only real power is the power to do good, there are certain presuppositions that we must accept, some of which are defensible, and some that raise more questions and that would require a leap of faith in order to accept.

Socrates takes a long-term view on the notion of power, as well as one that is highly influenced by the effects on one’s own soul. By the long-term, I mean that Socrates focuses on the consequences ones own actions have in the long run, categorising short-term pains and pleasure as respectively, either conducive to, or detrimental to eudaimoneia. Therefore, suffering pains in the knowledge that this will lead to good is a form of power, whereas living hedonistically and not building upon the virtues (arête), as Aristotle prescribes, is not power, as it can only lead to demise of one’s own soul. Socrates’ views here can be described as practically karmic. There seems to be an underlying belief that whatever goes around must come around, and what is done with evil intent shall not go unpunished.

Here, Socrates claims that even though the rhetorician would perhaps be able to argue his way out of punishment, if ever caught for doing an injustice, this still does not mean he has real power. The rhetorician has not taken into account that even though he has escaped immediate punishment, his own conscience will eat away at his soul. This guilt that follows from having done wrong, which Socrates claims will happen, entails that one would have a sense of what is right and what is wrong to begin with. Otherwise, it would appear that there is no punishment for doing wrong. This is inconsistent with the pet thesis that Socrates later nurtures – that one who has knowledge of good and evil will always choose to do good. The just person will not have acted unjustly. The person with no sense of justice will not feel any guilt when he has done wrong.

Socrates implies, nonetheless, that there will be retribution at some point in time – if not in this lifetime, then in the afterlife. It is, however, a rather large claim that the soul longs for that which is good. Firstly, we must accept that there is a soul, and that it does carry on it a record of what evil deeds we have performed. We must accept that there is an objective ground of good that this soul is aware of and will seek to follow, and that it will turn evil and be punished if this path of good is not followed.

Socrates’ argument steers away from the concept of power to the ability to achieve good, implying this to be the only type of power worth considering. His analogy of the cook aiming to please compared with the doctor knowing what is good for the health illustrate this, but do nothing to convince that this knowledge of what is good is the true power.

Thus, in claiming that the rhetorician has no real power, Socrates refers to his belief that only the power to do good is real power. What, then, is power? As defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, power is “the ability to do or act”. Socrates would add to that the word “well” or “good”. This, however, is not implicit in our notion of power. Another definition is “a. Government, influence, or authority. b. Political or social ascendance or control.”

Socrates’ views betray a naïve theoretical view of the world. Whilst it is hard to disagree with Socrates on a theoretical level, I find it hard to practically endorse his views. One would be hard-put to argue that the green political party was doing anything wrong – after all, it is not easy to state that saving the environment is a bad thing. However, they are not a political party that does not have a history of power or large-scale influence. It would seem that a tendency to act in accordance to a notion of what is good does not, in fact, promote power. Socrates calls for an ideal world where people would act fee of any conflict of interest towards a better society. This invokes a feeling of respect for the advocate of what is right, but does not practically have the power to change society. What is needed is an appeal to the self-gratifying nature of mankind

Nonetheless, the influence that Socratic thought has had over the course of time suggests that doing good does make an impact, at lease in theory. However, can one truly say that the political scene has changed since time days of ancient Greece? Political spiels that aim to please as many uninformed voters as possible are the basis of the campaigns run by would be presidents and their parties. Perhaps Socrates is saying that this undermines the power of democracy. Here, I would agree with him. The power of the rhetorician is not a power within the ideal of democracy, which relies on a nation of informed citizens making an informed choice. Rhetoric does not operate within this framework, but rather works counterproductively to it, promoting the masking of truth, and spewing forth notions that appeal to the majority. Indeed, if we are willing to accept the notion of democracy, and the presuppositions linked to this, we can reject rhetoric as having no power. After all, a city populated by the wise and the knowledgeable needs not advocates of popular opinion.

Even conceding, however, that there should be a nation where the citizens proactively choose to discover what is right and what is wrong is no guarantee that people will act in accordance to this. The pet thesis of Socrates - that a person, once fully cognoscente of the meaning of justice, will act in accordance to this is not a reasonable presupposition. Perhaps a master dietician will be able to prescribe a fully nutritious diet to anyone that comes for his services, but it does not mean that he himself will not ever indulge in a luxurious slice of cake once in a while. There is a presupposition that just action will always have priority over all other actions.

I would say that the rhetorician has power. It may not be the power that Socrates’ strongly advocates – the power to do good, but a power to wreak havoc. The cake maker may not have the power to make you healthy, but he does have the power to make you fat. The rhetorician’s power does not lie in improving society – other than by sheer coincidence, but he does have power to mobilise society. There is no implicit meaning to ‘power’ that implies that it is to be deployed only with the intention of good in mind. Examples abound in history of men and women who have used their power of rhetoric to achieve ghastly outcomes, e.g. Adolf Hitler. The great men in history, who have achieved what can be deemed as righteous and applaudable, such as Martin Luther King Jr., Mohandas Ghandi, Nelson Mandela, did not achieve what they did by virtue of knowing what was virtuous. Without the art of rhetoric to help them, perhaps South African and American black people would still be living in substandard conditions, and perhaps the people of India would still be unliberated.

Bibliography

1. The Concise Oxford Dictionary Ninth Edition CD-ROM, Oxford University Press 1997 – 1999, Licensed to Focus Multimedia Press, United Kingdom
2. Plato, ‘Gorgias’, translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones, 2004, Penguin Books Ltd., England
3. ‘The Greeks and the Good Life’ study guide and readings, Semester 2, 2004, Monash University Arts.

Sense and reference

2004-11-02T06:16:00.000+11:00

Frege’s work centres on developing a logo-centric version of language, so that it might be applied to the uncovering of knowledge without the danger of bias. His motivation for such work stemmed from his perceived need for a logical language so that he could more easily deal with logic in maths. At first glance, it may appear that he is, in fact, trying to work in the boundaries of psychologism, the theory that logic is a description of the natural and regular thinking pattern of persons. He is not, however, trying to perpetuate this at all, and his views, upon later inspection, reveal themselves to be anti-psychologistic. Rather, he seeks to impose a system of logic on a system of language he otherwise views as being illogical.

Frege makes the division between assertible and ontological truth, drawing the line, respectively, between those truths, which can be proven from feelings and experience, and those, which can be proven to be true simply by means of logic. His focus is on those truths that can be reached via means of logical reasoning, as these are the ones he focuses on, saying that it is these truths which are independent of the human mind, and exist regardless of whether or not people take it to be true. So here we see Frege’s anti-psychologism. If it were the case that logic was a description of the regularities of human thought, then if the entire world were to claim to conclude logically that donkeys were able to fly, then, on a psychologistic account, this would be the case. Frege dismisses assertible truths as being unconducive to the search for truth.

Frege speaks of sense and reference, as well as object and concept. Frege notes that in referring to objects, quite often it is possible to refer to the same object in many different manners. Thus, he splits meaning into two composites. An American might say ‘trashcan’, whilst an Australian would say ‘rubbish bin’ in the same conversation, whilst both referring to the object in which they would like to throw a used napkin. This Frege describes mathematically as ‘a=b’. He proposes that this is in a sense, like saying ‘1+4 = 2+2’. The values - ‘truth value’, i.e., ‘reference’ - of both sides of the equation are in fact, the same, but the angle of presentation (the ‘sense’) is different. Thus, it can be stated that ‘the trashcan is full’ is a ‘proposition’ which we are analysing. The sense of this proposition is different than that of ‘the rubbish bin is full’, but since ‘trashcan = rubbish bin’, and we can logically conclude that the ‘trashcan’ is, indeed, full, we can conclude that the reference of this proposition, is indeed correct, and thus, the sentence is true. Were this not to be the case, and the ‘trashcan’ were actually empty, the proposition ‘the trashcan is full’, while still possessing a discernible ‘sense’, would have the truth value of ‘false’, for the reference is does not, in fact, exist.

Frege also analyses the composites of the proposition, breaking them down into object and concept. In a proposition, say, ‘the butterfly is black’. The butterfly is the object of the sentence, and ‘is black’ is the concept. Frege introduces the idea of an unsaturated sentence, which is the object and verb combined, pending on a noun to complete it. So ‘the butterfly is’ on its own is not yet a proposition on it’s own.

Frege’s account then, seems to draw its basis on the Aristotelian view of language. Indeed, it has many close ties to Aristotle’s work, and at this point still sounds like what Aristotle says, albeit embellished, about sentences being true if the nouns and verbs combine in a way in which they express what is true, and sentences being false, if this is not the case.
However, there is a subtle, yet significant difference to the manner in which Aristotle formulates ‘true’ sentences to that which Frege does. Aristotle’s method is that of syntactic combination – he sees sentences in terms of subject and predicate, or noun phrase and verb phrase, combining to form sentences which are either true or false. Frege, as pointed out earlier, sees sentences in terms of object and concept, as mentioned earlier.

In Aristotle’s view, a sentence can refer to a universal or a particular. Universal concepts can be used to refer to an image or thought that is used to represent all things or beings falling under a single category, such as the word ‘planet’. This can, on the Aristotelian view, be used to signify Venus, Mars, a planet in a distant galaxy, an imaginary one, etc. The word ‘planet’ is thus used to refer to a general category of ‘planethood’. The properties of this universality are properties that would pertain to all items in this category. This universal term can be used to make generalities about, and represent, all members of this category, without referring specifically to any particular. Most importantly, in this view, the word ‘planet’ by itself has properties that can be ascribed to it. A particular is, on the other hand, a concept that can only refer to one item, therefore, most commonly, these words are proper names, such as ‘Foucault’.

Here, Frege makes a break from the views held by Aristotle. Frege rejects the idea of universality. The problem he encounters with it is that while we can imagine particulars, say, ‘Jupiter’, we cannot conjure up an image of a generic ‘planet’. Indeed, the concept seems somewhat cloudy, and this ideal of a ‘planet’ escapes us. The view that Frege is driven to – nominalism – is that there are no universal ‘ideas’ that can be justified. These universals do not have a meaning. They do not possess a reference, so therefore cannot be used to signify the true, as Aristotle does. Frege, instead, elects to say that they have no meaning independently as ideals, but only insofar as they are linked to certain sets of particulars. So, unlike Aristotle, Frege does not view sentences as universals relating to particulars, but rather as objects stating a concept relating to the object.

Frege views the concepts in a sentence as a kind of function, and describes it as a mathematical formula F(x,y), where F states the relationship between x and y. In this way, x and y are not independent of each other, as are the subject and predicate in the Aristotelian view. If x is to refer to ‘chilli’ and y to refer to ‘Calicles’, and the function to be ‘is loved by’, we have the sentence ‘chilli is loved by Calicles.’ The method that Frege uses prevents the problem of syntactical difficulties arising, as it does in Aristotle’s view, by appealing directly to the deep structure of a sentence. By stating the proposition in terms of the relation between x and y, Frege shows mathematically that we are in fact saying the same thing if we are to state ‘Calicles loves chilli’.

Expanding and deepening from where Aristotle left off, Frege introduces the notion of sentential connectives and quantifiers into his theory. Sentential connectives are words such as ‘and’ or ‘yet’, which serve to unify two propositions, forming a single sentence out of them.

Frege confronted the problem presented by propositions such as ‘transparent politicians do not exist’ and ‘nothing is free’ by creating a mathematical function that can be applied to language. The first sentence takes a sentential operator, or a negator and a concept and melds them together to form a ‘not-concept’, and attributing this to something that does not exist. The second is attributing a concept to a non-existent object. Frege breaks down these concepts first to the positive form, so from the first sentence, we have ‘transparent politicians exist’. In front of this claim, Frege places a horizontal line, to represent ‘the case’, or the proposition, so that now we have ‘the case that transparent politicians exist’. Since this is a false claim, Frege breaks up this horizontal line with a vertical line representing ‘not’ extending downwards from the middle of the horizontal. Now we have ‘not the case that transparent politicians exist’. Since we now have a true claim, Frege places what he refers to as a ‘judgement stroke’ vertically at the beginning of the line, and this represents the true. So, now we have ‘It is not the case that transparent politicians exist.’ Frege goes into much more minute detail on the functional representation of truth, but this, I feel is the core of it. From this we can derive a much more practical formula $x Fx, meaning ‘there is something which is F’. To indicate that there is not something which is F, then we add ‘~’, thus ‘~$ transparent politician x’. From the second case we get ‘~$ free x’ – ‘it is not the case that there is something which is free’.

The question arises as to whether Frege is too prescriptive in his theory, and in constructing his view into as many steps as he has made a theory that can only be applied to certain families of languages, including Germanic and Romantic languages. In Finnish, the sentence ‘nothing is free’ is expressed as ‘ei ole mitaan ilmaista’ is literally, ‘there is not something free’ In Thai, the word ‘mee’ means containing a property’, thus ‘mai mee arai tee mai mee rakaa’, is roughly translated as ‘there is not in the property of something that which does not have the property of price.’ Both languages seem to roughly overstep the need to reduce the sense of the sentence into positives from which a truth-value can be discerned. This undermines Frege’s system of three steps ‘proposition’ > ‘sense’ > ‘reference’. Indeed, the speakers of Thai and Finnish show no evidence that they are able to think any faster than the speakers of English or German, and are not congratulating themselves on their logical superiority.

What it suggests, instead, is that ‘sense’ is to some extent implicit in the ‘reference’ presented by any given sentence, and that the jump can therefore be made directly from the ‘proposition’ to the ‘reference’. Since it is impossible to always discern that a ‘reference’ may have more than one ‘sense’, recipients of a proposition treat these propositions on a case-by-case basis, with ‘sense’ factored into the ‘reference’. The speakers of a language do not remove the ‘reference’ from the context of the sentence. So, in asking ‘how is Mary’s partner?’ and ‘how is Jane’s father?’ perhaps, objectively speaking, both cases are referring to ‘Jonathan’. However, when the speaker replies ‘he is fine’, he is not referring to ‘Jonathan’, but rather to either ‘Mary’s partner’ or ‘Jane’s father’. The intention of the one making the interrogative has to kept in mind, and the intention when asking about ‘Jane’s father’ is different from the intention of inquiring about ‘Mary’s partner’. These two questions are referring to different roles of the same person, and the answer to these two questions may be radically different: ‘he is a good father’ or ‘he hasn’t been talking to Mary much recently’

Frege describes a doctrine of ontological truths combining to uncover more truths. He seems to have created a language that is free from bias in its scientific aims. However, for whom has he designed this system of notation? Frege is openly derisive about the way people have the tendency to think, claiming, “[there is] a widespread inclination to acknowledge as existing only what can be perceived by the senses”, opting, instead to take the path of logic. Logic, however, can be seen as too theoretical. As much as it is possible to logically conclude that time travel is possible, this does not mean that it exists.

As comprehensive as Frege’s account may be, he does not make any room for value judgements other than true or false in formulas. As far as describing human language goes, this seems to be a large inadequacy. Words such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘courageous’, ‘beautiful’ are words that Frege is forced reject as being universals. Frege’s nominalist view would have to, controversially, reject the idea of there being an objective good. Socrates, while basing much of his argument on logic, as does Frege, would hardly agree here. Of course, their accounts of logic do not agree. They may both agree that in logic resides the truth, but Socrates seems to lean towards a more psychologistic approach to logical argument, appealing to his opponent’s logic to reinforce his arguments. Frege, on the other hand, presupposes an independently existing logical system. In not factoring in any, in his view ‘subjective’ values, such as ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘beautiful’, Frege makes his study of logic even drier than mathematics, for mathematics does deal with unpredictable variables.

Frege says in the preface of ‘Begriffsschrift’ “it is not the psychological genesis, but the best method of proof that is at the basis of the classification”. Insofar as science is concerned, perhaps this is the case, but Frege is attempting to describe the machinations of language, something that is an invention of humans, and prescribe a logic by which it should function. His rationality is somewhat too concise, and in the end, it turns on itself. Frege does not take, into his calculations, account that people do not generally think in terms of mathematical functions. Any system, no matter how complete and comprehensive, only has value so long it is functional. The way Frege describes language does not truly represent the way in which logic functions in a person, but is a highly idealised, impractical account.

Bibliography
Aristotle, De Interpretatione, chapters 1-7 from The Works of Aristotle vol 1., ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 25–7.

Plato, Gorgias, trans. Walter Hamilton and Chris Emlyn-Jones. Penguin Books, England, 2004

Gottlob Frege, Preface to Begriffsschrift from Frege and Gödel: Two Fundamental Texts in Mathematical Logic, ed. Jean van Heijenoort. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1970, pp. 5-7

Gottlob Frege from the Preface to Grundgesetze der Arithmetic, from The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, trans. Montgomery Furth, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, pp. 10-25

Gottlob Frege, ‘Function and Concept’, from Michael Beaney ed. The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 130-48

Gottlob Frege, ‘Letter to Husserl’ from Michael Beaney, ed. The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 149-50

Roy Harris, ‘Frege on Sense and Reference’ from Landmarks in Linguistic Thought, 2nd edn. vol. 1, London and New York: Routeledge, 1997, pp. 196-208

Karen Green, ‘PHL2120 Language Truth and Power’. Clayton: Monash University Arts, Semester 2, 2004

Language and reality

2004-10-16T04:13:00.000+10:00

Whorf supports his claim that we “cut up nature, organise it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organise it in this way” by comparing the tendency of English speakers to organise our language into verbs and nouns by temporal delineations, and also by pointing out the semantic differences in our terms for labelling events.

When Whorf describes the categorisation of certain words, such as ‘run’, ‘hide’, and ‘strike’ he points out that these are verbs because they are used to denote events that are short-term. He then asks why it is, then, that certain words, such as ‘fist’ or ‘stance’ would be considered nouns, when they also describe temporary events. Whereas some concepts, which would be thought of as long-term in the English language, such as ‘house’ is in the Nootka language a verb, ‘it houses’ or ‘a house occurs’. This argument, detailed in ‘Science and Linguistics’ (Whorf: Language, Thought and Reality, pp.207-19) supports his claim that what governs our categorising of the world is in fact an arbitrary agreement we have come to as speakers of the English language.

Another argument by Whorf suggests that we use different semantic descriptions for the same events is hinted at in ‘Science and Linguistics and detailed in his essay ‘Languages and Logic’ (Whorf: Language, Thought and Reality, pp.233-45). He argues that since we use different concept to describe the same events, we must also understand the world in entirely different manners. When he contrasts the English sentences ‘The boat is grounded on the beach’ with ‘The boat is manned by picked men’ to their Nootka counterparts, he shows that whilst the two sentences are very similar in English, the two sentences bear little resemblance in Nootka. He suggests that this is because English focuses on reporting the event as is, whilst in Nootka, there is an implicit ‘why’ in the sentences, causing the sentences to focus rather on the reason the boat may be grounded on the beach and what for the men are in the boat.

In quoting Whorf in her article ‘Man Made Language’ Dale Spender seeks to explore the manner in which the English language uses certain biases to construct a sexist reality. Whorf claims that it is impossible to invent new terms outside of the accepted system, likening it to making “fried eggs without eggs” (1976:256). This supports her main thesis, that men have the power of ‘naming’ and use the biases already existent in English in a seemingly objective manner to invent names that perpetuate male supremacy and female sub-ordinance. In stating, “names are essential for the construction of reality” (Dale Spender: Man Made Language, pp. 163-71), she argues that without names, we are unable to perceive the world around us. She claims that without the aid of names, we exist in a world where all thoughts, ideas, objects and feelings are a chaotic mass, and it is only through labelling these items that we are able to think and act. She argues that since men have traditionally been the ‘namers’ it is now almost impossible to name things in a manner which is positively biased towards females or neutral without being ‘political’. She shows how in history, the rewriting and editing of the bible was a process whereby male intellectuals omitted positive female images over time. To her, this is a cycle which can only be deconstructed with time and careful ‘naming’.

Whilst Dale Spender uses Whorf’s claims to support her thesis, Steven Pinker is highly critical of them. Whorf argues from a basis of experimental thought, showing very little scientific evidence for any of his claims, while Pinker uses logic and evidence to argue his point. Whorf’s style may be said to be largely narrative, whereas Pinker’s arguments are generally logical. The central point to Pinker’s essay, Mentalese (Pinker: Ch.3 of The Language Instinct, pp. 55-82) is an antithesis to Whorf’s biased and circular manner of argument. In stating that people who speak differently from English speakers must also think differently, Whorf is unable to back this up with anything other than examples in language itself. Hence, Pinker is right in pointing out that the argument, ‘speakers of language X use different grammars and different words to label the world than do speakers of language Y, and therefore speakers of language X and speakers of language Y think differently’ is a false one, as there is no clause in this argument that directly links language with thought. As Pinker points out, Whorf’s argument is one based entirely on grammar. He does not, at any point, outline how it is, exactly, that our thoughts differ from that of speakers of Apache, Shawnee or Nootka. Whorf has designed his examples to perpetuate our pre-existing images of the ‘different’ or ‘exotic’ people speaking different and exotic languages. He only shows that the languages differ and concludes, perhaps too rashly, that our thoughts must also be intrinsically different, relying entirely on the reader’s pre-conceived biases towards a group of people that they are unfamiliar with.

Steven Pinker shows that there are alternatives to thinking that a language necessarily defines thought. His most compelling example is that of the Turing machine, which shows, through a system of symbols, that language is merely a system which thought can ascribe to. The machine that does not have any capabilities of thought is able to formulate conclusions and construct sentences which would be logical to speakers of any language, given that symbols are used in consistency, and there is a prescribed syntactic rule which does not mean anything to the machine. This shows that language is not the basis of our thought, but rather a system through which we process our thoughts.

He illustrates, then, examples of beings which show signs of thought despite the lack of a language system, such as babies, deaf adults who have not been exposed to language, and also primates, all of which are able to link and make connections between sets of objects without the aid of language. He goes on to argue that if these beings were unable to naturally differentiate between objects or ideas in the world, they would also be unable, then, to learn anything new. This is shown in the manner in which people with no language, such as Ildefonso and Helen Keller, learn by requesting names for already existing concepts in their minds.

While Steven Pinker does make a strong case against thought relying entirely on language, he fails to explore fully the concept of whether or not language then affects thoughts or culture to any extent. As a native speaker of three unrelated languages (Thai, Finnish and English), I would say that my own view of the world does not in any way change upon switching from one language to another. This supports Steven Pinker’s claim of there being an ingrained form of mentalese. However, Pinker’s arguments are based around the capabilities of the individual to think outside a language, and he fails to explore the impact that language might have on culture. While, as individuals, we can be made to understand concepts outside of our own language and culture, there is no denying that there are certain meaningful units used in some languages that have no direct translation in others. While this does not necessarily imply that those who do not think in this language are unable to conjure up images of those things once they are explained to them, it does show that some groups of people are more inclined to think about certain concepts more actively than those who have no names for certain concepts. The largest flaw in Steven Pinker’s argument is that of removing individuals from context. He may make a case for individuals being able to see the world in any light, given the proper tutoring, but he does not, however, make a case against language influencing thought, insofar as this is viewed from an anthropological viewpoint.

Machines and thought

2004-10-16T04:12:00.000+10:00

In debating whether or not a machine can think, I think it is important to ask, as Turing asked, what the “…meaning of the terms ‘machine’ and ‘think’” are. The definitions for these terms are vague, and more often than not linked with the capacity to emote and be capable of originality, rather than a straightforward ability to process data. I believe that it is important to separate the two – feeling and emotion are a human capacity. Thinking is not something that is restricted to humans, but is something that humans would like to believe, thus preserving their own sense of superiority. The onion analogy that Turing describes illustrates this point. Most of a person’s capacities to think can be described in a rather mechanical way, and it is not a given that upon stripping these layers of mechanical function away that we will discover where ‘true thought’ lies. Thus, thought can be described as the composite of all these parts, which make up the thought process, with significance attached to the functional organisation, as opposed to the originality of the outcome.

John Searle, however, objects to claims that a machine could think, basing his claim on a definition of ‘thinking’ in which ‘understanding’ would be implicit. He makes an analogy of an English-speaking man who is asked questions in Chinese writing, and in turn has a certain set of responses to choose from. For the system to be a ‘thinking’ entity, some component of it should understand Chinese. However, he does not understand Chinese, but he is given a set of instructions (‘the program’) that enables him to match the questions with a set of responses. This does not require that he is, in fact, capable of understanding Chinese. Thus, understanding Chinese cannot simply be a process of matching one set of data to another. He is, however, capable of passing the Turing test, and convincing the native Chinese speaker that he is a thinking being. Thus, Searle’s argument can be set out as: P1. Certain objects are incapable of understanding (eg, Chinese), P2. The person, the symbols and the room are all incapable of understanding of this kind, P3. If all these items are incapable of an understanding of Chinese, then so must be the system that is comprised of them, and C. Therefore, there is no understanding occurring in the system. I find that whilst P1 and P2 follow, the leap from P2 to P3 is unjustified, and there is no evidence to support that there is not some form of understanding occurring either within or independently of the system.

Descartes’ famous line “I think, therefore I am” is an argument for a system of artificial intelligence not being capable of thought, given that this system must have a continuous, uninterrupted flow of thought in order to qualify. Since a system can be paused and restarted at will, and it’s stream of consciousness interrupted, the system, cannot, therefore be considered to be a thinking being, according to Descartes. As a rational, thinking being, with a continuous flow of thoughts, nothing can be done to convince one that one is not in existence. The very fact that a program is dependent on the computer for it’s existence means that it can be temporarily ‘paused’, rendering it inexistent for any period of time, and for that period of time, also incapable of thought. This dependence on a system for existence would render the program incapable of passing the Turing test, as all that would be required would be for somebody to restart it. Descartes argument, however, does not centre around this, but rather on the finiteness of such a program. He did not believe that a finite machine could mimic the infinite complexities of a human mind. It is one thing to write a sonnet – this machine however, would not be able to pause and reflect on the fact that it had just done so.

It should be fully possible, and already is, in the field of A.I. to construct a machine that is capable of learning and being subject to experience, and thereby to developing character of some form. Also, given specific tasks, machines are already capable of outthinking humans. Computers are already used in many fields of science to come up with solutions that the human brain has been incapable of finding, thus refuting the claim that machines are incapable of any original conclusions. So, given the advances technology has already made, I have no qualms in agreeing with Turing that it is, indeed, possible to create a machine that is capable of thought. A machine would arguably not be capable of expressing emotion, but there is no reason to assume that thought is not thought simply because it does not include emotional responses. Perhaps this thought could not be classified as human thought, which normally includes emotional responses to stimulus, but thought nonetheless.

Language and reality

2004-09-26T04:13:00.000+10:00

The ultimate good.

2004-09-16T04:09:00.000+10:00

In the opening of the Euthydemus, Socrates asks of Cleinias whether our ‘prospering’ depends on the possession of genuine goods, and whether health, beauty, wealth, etc. are such goods. Aristotle’s argues that a good life is achievable given the opportunities to exercise our capacities to reason, and will thus lead to Eudaimoneia. The factors that give us the opportunity to reason are the abovementioned ‘goods’.

Luck and good fortune in the Socratic view are merely by-products of wisdom. A truly wise person will always act well and always prosper, thus has no need of good fortune. However, this leads to a very rigid sense of knowledge. His idea for knowledge allows for no mistakes, and results in only an all-knowing individual being able to act wisely. It is true that we’ll have a higher chance of acting well given the proper knowledge, but it is not clear that we will always succeed without the help of luck. Here Socrates’ view that luck is superfluous is suspect.

The good things, from which humans benefit are, to Socrates, not ultimate goods – they are only beneficial to people insofar as they have the proper knowledge with which to use them. Thus, a rich man with proper knowledge can use his funds wisely, and a rich man who is foolish will not benefit from his money. A fool with no money will not be able to misuse this good, and thus cause less harm. In arguing, however, that wisdom is the necessary condition for benefiting from these goods, Socrates stumbles. In most cases, this would be true, but it cannot be said that a fool will necessarily misuse the goods that he possesses, and thus wisdom is not necessary for the proper use to goods, it is simply a condition that will aid in the proper use of them. It is possible to argue, however, that having wisdom is necessary in the understanding of whether or not the goods have been used in a beneficial manner.

Socrates argues that since conditional goods, such as health, wealth and beauty require wisdom for proper usage, then wisdom must be the greatest good of all. As wisdom does not require anything else to be beneficial, unlike the lesser goods, wisdom must in itself be the only thing that is good by nature. Furthermore, since the lesser goods depend upon wisdom being present in order to actually be goods, they can be said not be goods at all. Therefore, if wisdom is the only good that is self-sufficient, wisdom must be that which is sufficient for a happy life.

Socrates blunders in his claim that wisdom is, in itself, sufficient for a happy life. In outlining the lesser goods, I feel that Socrates is taking a step in the right direction, but to expel them from the picture completely with his claim of wisdom being sufficient for happiness is highly questionable. His earlier argument of a wise man using the lesser goods well to achieve happiness, and a foolish man using these goods poorly resulting in evil is clearly defensible. However, his sufficiency claim would have to agree that a poor, ugly and sickly man would be happy insofar as he was wise. This seems to imply the notion of acceptance into Socrates notion of wisdom, or else a view that wisdom would ultimately generate all of the goods. Perhaps a man that accepts his fate would ultimately be happy, but there is nothing in the context of wisdom that links the two together. If he argues that wisdom would generate the goods, then this detracts from the view that wisdom is of itself sufficient for happiness. This cannot be so, if the goal of wisdom then, is to generate the goods.

Little insight into Saussure

2004-08-13T04:15:00.000+10:00

-The article seeks to make it simpler to understand the concepts of Saussure, talking through the “Course in general linguistics”

-It takes us through the history of the time, concentrating on the emergence of holistic thought that was emerging at that point in time.

a) Saussure uses the paper analogy, saying that you can’t cut up one side of paper without cutting out the other, so thus also the “signifier” and “signified”
b) He argues that language is a central element in human society, and thus can not be analysed separately in the field of linguistics
c) He distinguishes between ‘langue’ and ‘parole’ – language and speech, stating that language is like the building, which is comprised of many bricks, but exists only as a whole. Speech is central in understanding language, but is not the structure – or the building
d) Context is also essential – even though words may have the same meaning, the value attached can not be seen as the same, given that the words function within different structures – thus five francs, once exchanged into German marks, will not buy the same amount of bread, even though they are to some degree exchangeable and comparable.

-The study of language must be separated into two types – diachronic and synchronic. Diachronic analysis is the analysis of the evolution of languages, whereas synchronic is the study of the language as frozen in time. Synchronic analysis must preceed diachronic, as there can be no strudy of the movement before there is study of the static.

-Saussure’s view means that we have to discard the notion of the evolution of languages, wherein certain phonemes and structures survive as a matter of course. It can not be argued that certain sounds naturally survive and naturally evolve into other structures – only those that are of use in the new systems will survive, i.e., survival of the fittest. Certain elements may survive throughout time, but quite often in an entirely new system, if and only if they can be assimilated. There is no study of the evolution of sounds, without the study of what values are attached to them.

-Relations between sounds and values are purely arbitrary. They lose their arbitrariness only due to the syntagmatic relations we attach to them. This is the relationship between those words and the surrounding sentences and images. However, symbols on their own can easily be swapped around – it is only when they are placed in context that these shifts can seem strange.

-Two ways in which symbols can be analysed

a) by exchanging them for something dissimilar, i.e., and idea or physical representation
b) by comparing them to other words
c) these analyses always happen only within a system – we are dealing with abstract equivalences, not real world ones – it is the exchange system that is the primary concern for study, not the actual exchange that occurs

-Absolute and relative arbitrariness: One argument against Saussure is that a system where meanings are absolutely arbitrary cannot be structured. Saussure replies by claiming that there is absolute and relative arbitrariness. Relative arbitrariness happens when two arbitrary symbols are used to form a new symbol that is then less arbitrary as it is linked in meaning to other symbols.

The terminator's approach to the self

2004-08-06T04:05:00.000+10:00

In the film Terminator, the character played by Arnold Schwarzzenegger inevitably fails to kill John Connors. Had he been successful, the story would have been inconsistent and paradoxical. The reason for this is that had John Connors died in the womb, the chain of causation would have led to a future where Arnold would not have had the task of coming back to alter the past. Arnold cannot, in the straightforward model of time we are looking at, (although this possibility would exist were we to consider branching time), both go back and not go back in time to kill Sarah Connors.

In order for one to speak of actions that occur in the future in the past tense, one has to make the distinction between personal and external time. Personal time is the time as measured, roughly, by any individual’s wristwatch, and resulting in the natural aging of a person. External time, however, is time as seen as the 4-dimensional plane as a whole, strung together in the chronological order of causation. Kyle speaks of Sarah’s future actions as occurring in the past. This is possible because in external time, he comes from a time where Sarah’s actions occur in the past. However, these actions occur in the future of her personal time (which, because she does not time travel, coincides with events in external time). The events that occur in the future of both Sarah’s personal time, and in the future of external time as seen from the vantage point of the year 1984. However, from the vantage point of Kyle’s personal time, these events occurred in the past, as he has memories of what comes to happen in external time and in Sarah’s personal time.

Sarah’s knowledge of the future presents a problem of freewill for her. She cannot continue to believe that she can freely act to change the future, because if she does, then the chain of causation will not proceed in a manner in which Kyle Reese would have travelled back in time to inform her of the events yet to occur. Should Sarah change the future, then there is no way in which she can have the foreknowledge of what will occur, thus, she is now logically bound to follow the path that is set out for her. For the events in Sarah’s future to occur differently, they have to be consistent with events that will occur and her knowledge of this. Thus, Sarah’s foreknowledge of the future is not compossible with events occurring otherwise.

Townsend argues that even though there is foreknowledge of the temporal order of things, this does not affect the causal order. Due to reverse causation, an agent can act freely in the present, as seen in the temporal order of things, to affect events in the past. Townsend uses the example of the ace-predictor, who has predicted that a free agent will choose a box containing one million dollars, if and only if that agent chooses that box only. Thus, he can act in a manner that will cause the ace predictor in the past to foretell that he will pick only that box. In this example, a agent would freely choose only one of the boxes, causing the ace-predictor in the past to foretell that he would choose that box. The same applies in any two-way communication in time – causal order need not occur only in one direction in a four-dimentionalist view of time.

paternalism? social tolerance?

2004-05-26T03:44:00.000+10:00

Paternalism is overriding a person’s autonomy for that person’s own future benefit. It can be argued that in doing so, one is acting to satisfy a person’s future preferences, and therefore not entirely overriding their autonomy. This includes cases such as with preventing somebody from committing suicide or taking addictive drugs.

Intrinsic properties are properties that exist on their own. These qualities are such that they are not dependent upon their surroundings or effected by them. These are properties such as the colour, size and weight of, for example, an apple, or that a square box has six sides. Relational properties, on the other hand, exist only in relation to their surroundings and are entirely dependent upon them, such as an apple being inside a box, as opposed to being outside of it or being eaten by a child.

Bernard William objects to the relativist argument for social tolerance by saying that the argument is internally inconsistent. P1: Different cultures have different moral codes and C1: ‘All values, all matters of right and wrong are relative to one’s own culture’ are inconsistent with C2: ‘It is wrong to be intolerant of the practices of those from other cultures.’ This is because C2 makes a universal statement: ‘In all cultures it is wrong to be intolerant…’ The universal claim that is made is directly inconsistent with P1 and C1, which assert that no universal statements can be made. Even given that we accept moral relativism, we are faced with the problem of the tyranny of the majority, as moral relativists hold that what is right in a culture is what the majority of the people hold to be moral truths – this would mean that a 60% majority of people who believed in murder would be justified in killing off the 40% minority that held opposing beliefs.

Sentient beings, whether or not they can be regarded as a person have a capacity for expressing the preference to not suffer. Regardless of who expresses the desire, it is important to give like preferences equal consideration. Humans do not give equal consideration to the preferences of non-human beings. Singer argues that humans, in their treatment of animals, display a ‘speciest’ attitude. Humans give priority to the preferences of other human beings simply because they are human beings. This is an indefensible double standard. This is comparable to white people being given preference over black people two hundred years ago, or men being given preference over women 50 years ago, based on arbitrary judgements about the value of preference based on external appearance. It is noteworthy that Singer is not attempting to argue that it is wrong to kill animals (they exhibit no desire to not die) but simply that it is wrong to make them suffer, as they do have those preferences. He is arguing for equal consideration of interests as opposed to equal treatment. It is also worth noting that in addition to not respecting sentient non-human preferences to not suffer, humans also value the preferences of a non-self-conscious human baby over those of an animal, such as a primate, which could be considered a person by more than just the minimum requirements. We can see this in experiments run on chimpanzees to attain results, which, whilst not necessarily benefitting humans in any way, are justified to humans because ‘speciesm’ renders animal life disposable.

imposition on freedoms?

2004-04-21T03:39:00.000+10:00

Autonomy can be expressed as the capacity of a person to make decisions concerning their own welfare and preferences. In order for a person to experience the right to autonomy and warrant other people’s respect for it, one must fulfil three conditions. These are (i) existence – one cannot respect the desires of potential or non-existent people, (ii) development – one must be in a state of mind or maturity that can be considered able make rational decisions, and (iii) possession of preferences – if a person does not have preferences, then it is not possible neither to violate nor respect them.

In conceding that we have a right to autonomy we say that we have a right to life. This, Glover argues, cannot on its own account for the wrongness of killing, or rather, it cannot account for the right to live. The consequence of giving priority to autonomy would mean paternalism is entirely unjustified. If a person has an unalienable right to live based on personal preference, then that person also has a right to die, should he or she wish to do so. Therefore, autonomy would allow a single person or a whole tribe to die, should their right to autonomy be justified. However, in extreme cases like this, many people think that paternalism can be justified, and that these people should be prevented from dieing against their wishes. Another consequence is that a person would not be allowed to kill in self-defence, as this would be violating the assailant’s preference for life. Finally, because of the three conditions to autonomy, one would not be in the wrong were one to kill a being that were not yet mature enough to have a preference for life, such as an animal, foetus or an infant.

In adopting a utilitarian approach to the value of autonomy, autonomy is not valued for it’s own sake, but for the instrumental value autonomy has in satisfying a person’s preferences. Autonomy is valuable in increasing the amount of satisfied preferences, but on it’s own, has no intrinsic value. Paternalism is entirely justified in this view, as greater good can be achieved in overriding autonomy in some cases. This does not, however, mean that utilitarians do not respect autonomy, as it is one of the most valuable tools in satisfying a large number of preferences.

In justifying the beri beri experiment, a utilitarian would say that greater good was achieved at the cost of some lives. Even when Fletcher knew almost certainly that the inmates were contracting the disease due to the white rice, he acted correctly in continuing the experiment. Thanks to the experiment, we are now able to prevent death by beri beri. Perhaps it is also worth noting that as the inmates were normally fed white rice, giving some of them brown rice and preventing their death is in fact increasing the amount of satisfied lives by a significant amount. Many of the inmates died, but many more would have died had the experiment not taken place. Even if a utilitarian were to take into consideration autonomy as having instrumental value, it could be argued that it would not be going against the principle entirely to proceed with the experiment. After all, one cannot override the preferences of a person that is not in a mental state fit enough to make decisions, so therefore the beri beri subjects preference for existence can not be entirely valid as they were insane, and therefore not entitled the right to autonomy.

cases for the existance of god

2004-03-26T05:38:00.000+11:00

In making a case for the existence of God, there are many arguments, of which the most convincing constitutes, as quoted from M. Martin’s, ‘Some Minor Evidential Arguments for God’, of the premises “(1) If morality is objective and absolute, then God exists. (2) Morality is objective and absolute. (3) Therefore, God exists. This claim is supported by the argument from consciousness, which seeks to claim that mental phenomena that are impossible to account for through science can be explained through theism.

The argument in itself is a valid one, although disagreements on the premises will cause this argument to be an unsound one. The main weakness in this argument is that there is nothing to suggest that morality is, in fact, objective and absolute. For one to find this argument sound, one must first establish why morality is objective and absolute.

Atheists will seek to explain the world through rational and materialistic means, stating that all thoughts and mental revelations can be directly derived from the laws of science and psychology. The fault in this, however, is the failure of science to find conclusive evidence to support the claim that all activity in the human psyche is directly caused by chemical reactions in the brain, although it can seek to present this theory very convincingly. One can take this lack of definitive evidence as indirect evidence for the existence of God. Of course, one can take each mental action and break them down into smaller components, thus explaining the ‘space’ from which these mental revelations come from. This argument against the existence of God is flawed in assuming that one can infinitely break down phenomena into smaller units of mental links and stimuli.

To argue for the existence of God through mental phenomena does not support a claim to monotheism. There could well be many gods across many cultures that administer this kind of mental activity in humans. However, if God is the ultimate lawgiver, then one could also suggest that God appeals to people through the medium of culture, thereby asserting an absolute and objective moral code, although viewed from the varied perspectives of relative upbringing and customs. As stated by Copleston “It would help to explain the differences in the perception of particular moral values.” If moral code were simply relative to culture, people would not have disagreements. Therefore, there must be one absolute and objective moral code, whereby it is then possible for people to have disagreements regarding it. Thus, God would exist as the ultimate lawgiver.

Coplestone’s claim, as paraphrased above, is a valid, although not entirely sound argument. It presupposes that there can be no set of moral values without a model to base them on. It is possible, however, to refute this argument by taking on a utilitarian view, whereby the reason people act as they do is to maximise the greater good. What people judge rationally to be right and what will facilitate survival of the species is therefore constituent in the sense of moral code and values that they have. This renders the set of moral values people have as survival instinct, as opposed to intrinsic values defined by God. However, as long as we don’t consider this utilitarian perspective (also laden with flaws), one can conclude that the originally proposed argument is the most convincing for the existence of God.